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Introduction to the Problems 
of Acquiring Properties from 
Partnerships, Corporations, 
Estates, and Trusts 
by William T. Hutton 
Negotiating the acquisition of entity-owned prop-
erties (i.e., property owned by a legal entity other 
than one or more individuals) generally raises a num-
ber of legal and strategic concerns not confronted in 
dealing with an individual landowner. In order confi-
dently to grapple with the complexity that such a 
transaction usually entails, the land trust negotiator 
would have to possess a fair working knowledge of 
the tax rules applicable to the entity involved, as well 
as a strategic appreciation for the objectives of the 
beneficial owners. Such knowledge and experience 
are hardly to be presumed, nor can they be gained in 
any relatively painless way. Our objective in this 
introductory excursion is not full-functional compe-
tence, therefore, but rather to gain a fundamental 
understanding of the system of taxation applicable to 
each type of entity apt to be encountered in a land 
trust's acquisition forays, so that the negotiator will 
have some sense of the obstacles likely to be encoun-
tered and the questions that need to be asked. 
Some Fundamental Precepts and Common 
Concerns 
The "entities" with which we are concerned here 
are recognized, for federal income tax purposes, as 
separate legal persons. They may be taxpaying per-
sons, as in the case of certain corporations, estates, 
and trusts, or they may be nontaxable entities, such as 
"s" corporations and partnerships, which are none-
theless important players because the tax consequences 
to their beneficial owners (shareholders or partners) 
will be determined with reference to those entities' 
transactions. As a general rule, land tru.st acquisi-
tions are substantially easier to effect when dealing 
with a nontaxable entity, but that is not to say that the 
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absence of a tax threat at the entity level will make a 
proposed acquisition as easy to accomplish as one in 
which the land trust deals discretely with several 
cotenants. 
Determining Legal and Beneficial Ownership 
In any case where there is the slightest indication 
that a person other than one or more individuals may 
be the legal owner of property, the land trust repre-
sentative must determine where legal title and benefi-
cial ownership reside. In every case of entity owner-
ship, legal ownership of the property and the ultimate 
economic benefits or detriments of that ownership 
will be divided; e.g., a corporation is the legal owner 
of its timberland, with the power to sell, lease, har-
vest, etc., but the benefits of that ownership inure to 
its shareholders. 
Problem (1). Sturdley Valley Land Trust has 
recently learned that a crucial parcel of an assem-
blage it intends to preserve as agricultural open 
space through the acquisition of conservation 
easements is owned by "The Old Boys' Four-
square Trust." The land trust's executive direc-
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tor is, accordingly, preparing a preliminary letter 
of introduction, and she intends to include a hy-
pothetical case study illustrating the potential 
benefit of an easement contribution to trust ben-
eficiaries, making various assumptions about in-
come levels and tax benefits. Is this approach 
strategically sound? 
Before presuming to illustrate tax benefits (an 
enterprise that is inherently risky even where most 
facts are known), it is essential to know that you are 
playing in the right ballpark. The designation "Trust" 
is hardly definitive; in many states corporations may 
be so named, and even if a true trust, Old Boys' may 
not have those attributes generally associated with 
trusts; for example, it may be a tax-exempt social 
club or a charitable remainder unitrust. And as we 
shall see, even where the nature of the entity is fully 
known and understood, it is generally fruitless to 
attempt to illustrate tax consequences without the 
same assurance about the nature of that entity's ben-
eficial ownership. 
Basis and Holding Period 
As in any conservation acquisition, the land trust's 
ability to provide a tax-beneficial deal is apt to turn 
upon the tax consequences of alternative potential 
transactions. In order to make a plausibly accurate 
representation of those consequences, it is necessary 
to have the same information, with respect to the 
entity's basis and holding period, as in the case of 
properties owned by individuals. It may also be 
necessary, in order fully to represent the consequences 
of transactions with an entity, to have the same infor-
mation with respect to the basis and holding period of 
shareholders' or partners' interests in a corporation or 
a partnership. 
Establishing Lines of Communication 
Although it may appear that a dominant share-
holder or managing partner has the authority to nego-
tiate a transaction for a corporation or a partnership, 
or that a trustee's management powers would appear 
to permit a bargain sale, the requirements of fiduciary 
duty applicable to one in such a position make such 
an assumption hazardous. Where the transaction 
sought by the land trust involves a charitable contri~ 
bution, as it most often will, the land trust must 
generally be assured that all beneficial owners are 
aware of the full implications of the transaction and 
are apt not to object. In many cases, the requirements 
of contract or law may necessitate the agreement of 
all, or a high percentage, of the beneficial owners. 
For example, a partnership which seeks to dispose of 
a principal asset by way of a bargain sale may well 
need the acquiescence of a majority (or a higher 
percentage) of its limited partners, although those 
persons would normally have no control over day-to-
day business affairs of the partnership. Similarly, a 
trustee who seeks to dispose of the trust property for 
less than appraised value may need court approval, 
which is apt to be conditioned upon the understand-
ing and approval of all affected beneficiaries. 
The land trust representative must appreciate, 
therefore, that it may be necessary to countenance 
and endure the participation in negotiations of a con-
siderably greater number of players than might be 
necessary in a normal "business" transaction. Not 
infrequently, for example, where a substantial bar-
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The potential partnership acquis ition is fa r and gain . and loss equally (although, as we shall soon see , 
av.;ay the least forbidding of the various that need not be the case). Thus each would have a 
clisc ussed in this artic le. A partnership is an aggre- $140,000 gain to report, taxed at a maximum fed eral 
gat.e of persons (which may include other entities - rate o f 28% . 
even other partner-ships -- as well as individuals) 
who agree to share the ri sks and reap the rewards of a 
bus iness or investment venture. In respect of certain 
tax consequences of partnership operations , the "ag-
gn::gate" nature of the legal entity dictates the result; 
rn()s t obviously, partnership income i s attributed to its 
pan ners the partnership itself never pays tax -- -
and partnership losses are similarly aHocated for (pos-
use by the partners on their own re turns. But 
fur other purposes, the "entity" aspect of the partner-
Slllp prevails; thus, if partnership property is taken by 
condemnation , in order to protect the realized gain 
fro m recogn i lion under ~ 1033, the partnership itsel f 
must make a qualifying reinvestment --- reinvestment 
Ill' each partner of his or her aliquot share of the sale 
proceeds will not suffi ce . 
Outright Sales 
We begin with the following problem in order to 
an apprec iation for the way in which tax liabili-
ties arc determined with respect to the di sposition of a 
significantly apprec iated partnership asset. 
Problem (2) . Ike, Mike, and Petra formed the 
LMP Partnership in 1984 , each contributing 
5 100,000 cash. Their intent , as stated in the 
written 1M}) Partnership Agreement, was to "ac-
quire, hold, and manage developed and undevel-
oped real estate for current income and capital 
appreciation. " Among the properti es they ac-
quire,{j, for $60,000, was a 120-acre woodland 
which they believed would be ripe for subdivi-
sion within ten years. Time has proved the IMP 
partners' original assumptions correct, if a bit 
conservative. A developer has recently made an 
offer of $480,000. What will be the effec t of a 
sale by the partn ership at that price? 
IMP's gain will be characterized and measured at 
t.he partnership leve l. Its basis is its "cos t" ; i.e. , 
S60,O()O. Its amount realized , ignoring transac tion 
cos ts, is 5480,000. Thus the IMP gain is 5420,000, 
and , since the asset has be(' n he ld as in vestment prop-
~~ ny, in the expectation of appreciation in value , the 
No te that the tax effects just described will ob-
tain whether or not the partnership distributes the sale 
proceeds. Inc lusion of the $ 140,000 gain by each 
shareholder will create a corresponding increase in 
the bas is of his or her partnership interest (i.e. , by 
$140,000); if the proceeds of sale are distributed , u1e 
basis will be reduced by tha t distribution (i.e ., by 
$160,(00). The partners' "capital accounts" will be 
similarly adjusted, as described be low. 
Thus , in this simple and quite common example, 
the results of the sale at the partnership level are 
predictably filtered into the partners' own individual 
tax returns - one-third of the partnership-level gain 
is allocated to each, and the income tax liability of 
each is determined, in part, with reference to that 
gain . 
Bargain Sales 
Problem (3) . Suppose , in the alternative , that 
Sturd1cy Valley Land Trust seeks to avert a con-
version of IMP's woodland to subdivision, and, 
accordingly, proposes a bargain sale at a price of 
$360,000 (i.e., 75 % of appraised value). The 
partners confer and agree to accept this proposal. 
Now the partnership has made a bargain sale , and 
the $3 15,000 gain at the partnership level ($360,000 
less allocated basis of $45,000) will be attributed to 
the partners in equal $105,000 shares. The partner-
ship will also have made a contribution of appreci-
ated capital gain property in the amount of $120,000, 
and that too will flow to the partners equally « each 
will have a $40,000 contribution of capital gain prop-
erty subject to the 30%-of-adju sted-gross-income 
(AGI) limitation. (Note that each partner's AGI will 
be increased by $105,000 by the gain from the IMP 
bargain sale.) In this simple case, the results to the 
partners arc identical to those which would have ob-
tained had they merely owned the property as 
cotenants, and agreed to sell the ir undivided interes ts 
for $ 120,000 each. 
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Special Allocations of Gain and Contribution 
Not infrequently, the willingness to consider a 
charitable disposition will vary from partner to part-
ner. 
Problem (4). Ike is a member of the board of 
Sturdley Valley Land Trust, and has in fact en-
couraged the bargain purchase offer to IMP. Petra 
is mildly supportive of the proposal, but Mike, 
whose recent financial reversals have severely 
limited his ability to make use of charitable de-
ductions, is unlikely to accede to a bargain dispo-
sition, unless he is not "made to suffer." Can a 
deal still be made without raising the land trust's 
offer? 
It might be suggested that Mike be allocated a 
share of the sale proceeds equal to one-third of the 
fair market value of the property ($160,000). This 
will require that Ike and Petra take no more than 
$200,000 of those proceeds, and that the full amount 
of the charitable contribution be allocated to those 
two partners. Assuming that Ike agrees to bear the 
full cost of Mike's insistence on receiving full fair 
market value, the allocation of gain, charitable contri-
bution, and cash distributed would be as follows (in 
thousands of dollars): 
Charitable Cash 
Gain Contribution Distributed 
Ike 70 80 80 
Mike 140 -0- 160 
Petra 105 40 120 
Ignoring tax consequences, Mike would appear to be 
advantaged by this special arrangement to the extent 
of $40,000 - the increase in the amount of cash he 
receives over that he would have received had the 
gain, charitable contribution, and sale proceeds been 
allocated equally. Similarly, Ike would appear to be 
disadvantaged by $40,000, and the disparity between 
the two appears to be $80,000. But Mike will pay 
$19,600 more federal income tax than Ike on the gain 
(28% of $70,0(0), and Ike will enjoy a $24,800 tax 
benefit attributable to his specially allocated share of 
the charitable contribution (31 % of $80,(00). So the 
real gap between the bottom-line consequences to Ike 
and Mike will be $35,600. That amount might prop-
erly be described as the measure of Ike's "dispropor-
tionate, disinterested generosity." 
W ill the special allocation of the partners in such 
a situation be respected by the IRS? Testing the 
validity of partners' special allocations is one of the 
most complicated and vexing areas of tax practice. 
The statute requires that, to be respected, a special 
allocation must have "substantial economic effect." 
IRC §704(b). Well over 100 pages of dense Treasury 
Regulations elaborate on that standard, in ways so 
wondrous strange as best to be described here as 
simply "beyond our ken." For our purposes it will do 
to understand that the partners' allocation must either 
bear or deny economic fruit. 
To illustrate, in the example above, Ike's dispro-
portionate allocation of charitable contribution was 
matched by a corresponding reduction in the amount 
of sale proceeds distributed to him; correspondingly, 
Mike's disproportionately greater allocation of sale 
proceeds was matched by a correspondingly greater 
reportable gain. Conformity of the arrangement with 
economic reality is readily perceived. If no distribu-
tion of the sale proceeds had been made, the partners' 
"capital accounts" (an ongoing measure of each 
partner's economic interest in the partnership) would 
have to have been adjusted so thatfuture distributions 
would take account of the disproportionate bargain 
sale/charitable contribution allocation (i.e., after in"' 
creasing capital accounts for the gains and decreasing 
them for the charitable .deductions, Mike's capital 
account would have been $150,000 greater than Ike's 
at the end of the day.) The concept of "capital ac-
count" is the touchstone of the regulations' approach 
to the determination of substantial economic effect. 
Conservation Easements 
Transfers of conservation easements by partner-
ships produces little additional complexity. Provided 
that the transfer meets the requirements of § 170(h), a 
bargain sale or outright donation of a conservation 
easement affords the same opportunities and chal-
lenges in a partnership context as does any other type 
of donation. 
Problem (5). Ike has persuaded Mike and Petra 
that the IMP donation of a conservation ease-
ment, limiting future uses of the woodland to 
recreational pursuits, will be an appropriate civic-
minded thing for them to do, producing intan-
gible satisfactions as well as measurable tax ben-
efits (the easement will reduce the value of the 
property from $480,000 to $120,0(0), Mike and 
Petra have agreed to allocate 50% of the result-
ing charitable contribution to Ike. Immediately 
before the contribution is made, each partner's 
capital account stands at $100,000. 
This problem ' raises the question of whether the 
partners' allocation can meet the "substantial eco-
nomic effect" test under these circumstances. A 
November/December 199~ 
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partner's capital account is, in effect, a constantly 
adjusting measure of his or her economic interest in 
the partnership. Here, where allocating $180,000 of 
the contribution to Ike would drive his capital ac-
count negative by $80,000, the transaction will lack 
substantial economic effect, and the allocation will 
therefore not be r~spected for tax purposes, unless Ike 
is unconditionally required to restore the deficit bal-
ance in his capital account upon liquidation of the 
partnership. Thus, in order to make the intended 
disproportionate allocation of charitable contribution 
"real" for tax purposes, the economics of the part-
ners' arrangement must mirror the tax treatment. Since 
Ike intends to enjoy a substantially greater charitable 
contribution deduction than either of his partners, 
that current benefit requires that his future claim to 
partnership assets be correspondingly diminished, and, 
in the event that partnership assets upon dissolution 
are insufficient to satisfy the disproportionately greater 
claims of his partners, that he make a capital contri-
bution to the partnership at that time (in the amount of 
any deficit in his capital account) to make up the 
shortfall. 
[This may well take you somewhat further than 
you need to go. The essential question, where any 
disproportionate allocation of charitable contribution 
is suggested, is "Will the special allocation meet the 
requirements of the regulations as to "substantial eco-
nomic effect"?] 
Acquisitions of Corporate Properties 
Perhaps the most revolutionary aspect of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 was the repeal of the so-called 
"General Utilities rule." Under that rule, of judicial 
origin but long reflected in statutory provisions gov-
erning corporate distributions and liquidations, a cor-
poration was permitted to distribute appreciated prop-
erty without recognizing the lurking gain (with cer-
tain limited exceptions). Under the regime which 
persisted until the 1986 Act change, therefore, con-
servation organizations had several promising avenues 
towards the acquisition of highly appreciated corpo-
rate lands - a threshold distribution of property to 
shareholders via distribution or liquidation; an acqui-
sition of stock by bargain purchase or gift, followed 
by redemption or liquidation; a spin-off of the target 
property into a new corporation, followed by acquisi-
tion of the stock of that company from the parent or 
its shareholders; etc. Virtually all of those possibili-
ties are now foreclosed; the land trust contemplating 
an acquisition of corporate real estate will most likely 
hear a dismal litany of prospective tax consequences. 
There are, however, two happy exceptions to that 
gloomy forecast, and, to accentuate the positive, we 
November/December 1992 
begin with the one most likely to be encountered 
where the land trust dea1s with a closely held com-
pany. 
S Corporation Properties 
The S corporation enjoys immunity from tax and 
is treated, in most respects, like a partnership. While 
it is chartered as a corporation under state law, and 
thus affords its shareholders the usual immunity from 
liability for corporate obligations, it is not, generally, 
a taxpaying entity; its income, gains, and losses are 
computed at the corporate level, as are the various 
components thereof which may have differing effects 
upon the tax situations of its shareholders. Those 
items are reported by the shareholders according to 
their proportional stock ownership. Thus an S 
corporation's transactions generally produce only one 
level of tax consequence- to the shareholders. 
Definition. The fundamental requirements for 
qualification to elect and maintain S corporation sta-
tus are the following: 
(a) not more than 35 shareholders (husband and 
wife are treated as one shareholder); 
(b) each shareholder is an individual, an estate, 
or one of four types of qualified trusts; 
(c) no shareholder is a nonresident alien; and 
(d) there is no more than one class of stock. 
Further, a corporation will not qualify for S status if it 
is a member of an affiliated group of corporations, or 
is one of several types of corporations specifically 
described in the statute. 
Effects of S corporation donations or bargain 
sales. The consequences of an S corporation dona-
tion of land, or a bargain sale, are similar to those 
described above as to partnerships. There are, how-
ever, two salient distinctions. First, S corporations 
have no license to make special allocations of gain or 
charitable contribution among their shareholders; the 
gain and/or contribution amounts are allocated ac-
cording to stock ownership. Second, an S corpora-
tion shareholder's charitable deduction is limited by 
his basis in stock and debt (if any). 
Problem (6). Land Baron Properties, Inc. elected 
S corporation status upon its incorporation in 
1977. Among its several properties is an eco-
logically important slough of about 300 acres, 
which is proposed to be sold to the Birdwatchers 
Anonymous Land Trust at a bargain-sale price of 
$50,000 (appraised value is $150,(00), adjusted 
basis $75,(00). Land Baron has five equal share-
holders, four of whom favor the transaction « the 
dissenter is adamantly opposed. If the corpora-
5 
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tion makes the proposed bargain sale, what tax 
consequences will obtain? 
The relevant statute requires that each shareholder 
report one-fifth of the total charitable contribution 
and a similar fraction of the realized gain. An attempt 
to take account of the dissenter's objection by adjust-
ing the economic consequences will be hazardous. 
For example, were the corporation to approve a spe-
cial distribution of cash or property to the dissident, 
in order to take account of his inability to make use of 
his share of the contribution, that authorization might 
well lead to the conclusion that the corporation main-
tained more than one class of stock. (The more-than-
one-class-of-stock rule has been the subject of rather 
intense scrutiny and debate over the past couple of 
years, and Land Baron's advisors are apt to be ex-
tremely sensitive to potential breaches of that rule's 
requirements.) 
S corporations with prior histories. In order to 
take comfort in S corporation status, it will be neces-
sary to determine (i) that the corporation has always 
maintained S status, (ii) that the corporation has been 
an S corporation for more than ten years, or (iii) that 
the corporation converted to S status under special 
provisions of the 1986 Act which required an election 
to be made prior to January 1, 1987. A corporation 
not described in the preceding sentence with a prior 
history under the provisions applicable to regular 
business corporations (Subchapter C of the Internal 
Revenue Code) may be subject to corporate-level tax 
on the amount of appreciation in its assets as of the 
date of conversion to S status (so-called "built-in 
gain"). 
Problem (7). Suppose that Onyx Properties, Inc., 
after several years of operation as a regular busi-
ness corporation, converted to S status for its 
taxable year beginning January 1, 1990. At that 
time, one of its orchard properties, Flaming Ar-
row Farms, had a basis of $120,000 and a fair 
market value of $500,000. It is now worth 
$750,000, and Onyx proposes to make a bargain 
sale of the property to the Sidewinder Land Trust 
for $500,000. What result? 
Onyx's built-in gain on the Flaming Arrow prop-
erties is $375,000. Thus an outright sale of the prop-
erty for $750,000 would result in $375,000 of corpo-
rate-level gain recognition, and Onyx would pay tax 
on that gain. The proposed bargain sale would, there-
fore, force the recognition of substantial gain at the 
corporate level - presumably two-thirds of the total 
built-in gain (on account of the relativity to contribu-
tion to sale price, although neither the statute nor 
regulations provides assurance that the IRS would 
apply such a pro-rata approach in a case involving 
built-in gain). 
In the case of an outright donation or a conserva-
tion easement gift, however, the fact that the subject 
property represents the potential for recognition of 
built-in gain should have no untoward effects, since 
there is no recognized gain. The deduction attribut-
able to the conservation easement would pass through 
to the shareholders, and the consequences would be 
identical to those applicable to an S corporation not 
subject to the built-in gain rules. 
C Corporation Properties 
Potential acquisitions of C corporation proper-
ties (so labeled because their owners, taxable busi-
ness corporations, determine the tax consequences of 
their transactions under Subchapter C of the Internal 
Revenue Code) raise significantly different planning 
problems. A C corporation is a fully taxable entity; 
its taxable income produces a corporate-level federal 
income tax at rates that graduate to 34% for taxable 
income in excess of $75,000 (that rate applies to both 
ordinary income and long-term capital gains). Thus, 
for a corporation which contemplates the sale of a 
highly appreciated tract of land and the distribution of 
sale proceeds to its shareholders, the so-called "double 
tax effect" may seem positively confiscatory. 
Problem (8). Orca Equities, Inc., a C corpora-
tion, acquired a Lake Michigan island property 
for $100,000 in 1967. It has recently received a 
solid, all-cash offer to dispose of that property 
for $1,100,000. If it does so, and distributes the 
proceeds of sale, net of corporate tax, as a divi-
dend to its shareholders, each of whom is in the 
maximum (31 %) federal income tax bracket, what 
will be the after-tax results? 
The federal income tax imposed on Orca will be 
$340,000 (34% of its $1 million gain). That leaves 
$760,000 for distribution to the shareholders, which, 
after a 31 % tax of $235,600, reduces their net to just 
$524,400. 
As this simple but painful example so vividly 
illustrates, the combined rate of tax on the 
corporation's $1,000,000 gain is 54.46%. Faced with 
sue h discouraging arithmetic, it is little wonder that 
advisors to shareholders who find themselves in such 
circumstances are inclined to explore highly "cre-
ative" alternative possibilities. The land trust must be 
vigilant to ensure that any suggested disposition plan 
is not simply an attempt to shift some part of the 
aggregate tax liability to the land trust. 
November/December 1992 
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When a corporate donation or bargain sale makes 
sense. When a corporation has substantial income, a 
donation of property producing current tax benefits to 
the corporation may be attractive. In order to be fully 
deductible, the amount of the charitable contribution 
may not exceed ten percent of the corporation's tax-
able income for. the year of the gift. Should the 
donation exceed that amount, the excess carries for-
ward for up to five years. 
Problem (9). Murgatroyd Electronics, Inc., a 
public company, expects to have taxable income 
of not less than $15 million this year. Surplus 
suburban real estate, with a basis of $200,000 
and a fair market value of $1.2 million, is sought 
as a gift by the Purgatory Hollow Land Trust, 
which seeks to preserve that property as part of a 
greenbelt. What tax benefits will Murgatroyd 
enjoy in respect of an outright donation? 
The $l.2 million donation, fully deductible this 
year, will produce $408,000 in federal income tax 
benefits (34 % of the fair market value of that prop-
erty). A sale at fair market value, assuming a 10% 
offset for transaction costs, would leave the company 
with $780,800 after tax. It may fairly be represented 
then, that an outright donation of $1.2 million costs 
rvlurgatroyd only $372,800. 
Bargain sales at the corporate level may also 
produce relatively salutary results, assuming that the 
proceeds of sale may be put to work in the business 
and not distributed to the shareholders. 
Problem (10). Assume, in the Murgatroyd situa-
tion, that the company is not in a position to 
make an outright donation, but agrees to sell the 
property to Purgatory Hollow at 50% of its ap-
praised value ($600,000). 
The charitable contribution aspect of this trans-
action produces a tax benefit of $204,000 (34% of 
$600,000). The bargain sale leaves $430,000 after 
tax ($600,000 proceeds less $100,000 allocated basis 
times 34% = $170,000 tax). The company thus r~ll­
izes $634,000, just $145,800 short of the return on an 
outright sale (again assuming 10% transaction costs 
on a market transaction). Note, however, from Pur-
gatory Hollow's perspective, this transaction is noto-
riously inefficient; it costs the land trust $600,000 to 
amplify Murgatroyd's after-tax return by $226,000. 
Distributions. of property and contemplation of 
shareholder donations. In the good old days, under 
the General Utilities rule it was frequently possible to 
make distributions of highly appreciated target prop-
erty to one or more shareholders, either as a dividend 
distribution or, more likely, in redemption of stock or 
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pursuant to a liquidation of the corporation. Such a 
distribution could be effected with only shareholder-
level tax, and, in the redemption or liquidation sce-
nario, the shareholder tax was nearly always com-
puted at capital gain rates. That set the stage for the 
shareholders to make a donation or bargain sale. Un-
der the post-1986 regime, the distribution of appreci-
ated property by the corporation will be a taxable 
event. Thus double-tax consequences are inescap-
able - gain at the corporation level and dividend or 
capital gain to the shareholder(s). 
Problem (11). With reference again to 
Murgatroyd's greenbelt property, suppose it 
makes a pro rata dividend distribution of the 
target property to its shareholders, who in tum 
make contributions of their undivided interesLs to 
the land trust. What are the after-tax results to a 
10% shareholder? 
Before the transaction a 10% shareholder in 
Murgatroyd had an equitable interest in the target 
property worth $120,000 (this ignores, of course, the 
lurking corporate tax liability.) After the distribution, 
his interest in the corporation has been diminished by 
$154,000 ($120,000 land pI us $34,000 corporate tax 
liability on account of the distribution.) He has land 
worth $ 120,()()0, but its distribution costs him a tax on 
the dividend of $37,200 (31 % of $120,(00). Upon 
donation of that property, he realizes a tax benefit of 
identical magnitude (31 % of $120,(00). The end 
result demonstrates that this is a virtually inconceiv-
able transaction. It has cost our shareholder $154,000 
of corporate value to convey a benefit of $120,000. 
Compare this result to the corporate-level outright 
donation described above. There, even if the corpo-
ration can make no use of the tax benefits, the "cost" 
of making the donation is limited to the value of the 
property_ 
Were the distribution and donation described in 
Problem (11) to have taken place in the context of a 
liquidation plan, the results would be marginally bet-
ter. The shareholder-level tax would be computed on 
the shareholder's gain on the liquidation; i.e., the full 
distribution would not be taxable, but only the excess 
of the value of the properties received over the 
shareholder's stock basis. And that gain would be 
taxed at 28%, rather than 31 %. These slight improve-
ments are not likely to add up to a heart-pounding 
inducement. 
Stock transactions. The double-tax discourage-
ment.s just described are most frequently encountered 
by closely-held and family companies, usually in con-
nection with proposed dispositions of major proper-
ties where corporate-level income is entirely inad-
---------------------~ 
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equate to accommodate the intended charitable con-
tribution. In those circumstances, a stock donation or 
bargain sale is apt to seem, to the affected 
shareholder(s), an exceedingly good idea. 
Problem (12). Boggy Wallow Land Trust has 
recently acquired an option to purchase a 565-
acre woodland. the only significant asset of Box-
wood, Inc .• a C corporation. Boxwood's basis is 
$175,000, the property's appraised value is 
$2,575,000, and the option price is $1,800,000. 
The transaction was negotiated by Boxwood's 
regular attorney, Kitty Maroon, who has no par-
ticular expertise in tax matters. Subsequent to 
execution of the option contract, Kitty consulted 
with the corporation's accountants, and their re-
view of the tax consequences has stimulated con-
sideration of an alternative plan. Kitty has now 
proposed to Boggy Wallow that the land trust 
acquire 100% of the stock of the corporation for 
$1.8 million, subject to appropriate indemnities 
to protect the land trust against known and un-
known corporate liabilities. Should the land trust 
accede to Kitty's request to change the structure 
of the deal? 
Unless the proposed indemnities include reim-
bursement for corporate-level tax on the ultimate liq-
uidation (highly unlikely), the suggested reformula-
tion must emphatically be rejected. Once Boggy 
Wallow becomes the owner of the corporation, it will 
assume, as a "transferee," the liability for corporate 
taxes subsequently accruing. When the land trust 
causes the corporation to be liquidated and its only 
significant asset distributed, the corporation will real-
ize a gain of $2.4 million and a federal income tax 
liability of $816,000. Although that liability belongs 
to the liquidating corporation, the IRS will exact sat-
isfaction from the distributee of the corporate assets, 
Boggy Wallow. Were Kitty to succeed in this at-
tempt, the apparent bargain sale of stock becomes a 
sale at a premium. 
As is apparent from this example, the value of 
the Boxwood stock may not properly be determined 
with reference only to the value of its properties; one 
must consider, as well, the lurking corporate-level tax 
liability. Thus, in order to effect a true bargain sale of 
stock in these circumstances, the shareholders would 
have to agree to sell their stock at a price significantly 
less than $1,759,000 - the value of the Boxwood 
properties less the $816,000 potential income tax li-
ability. 
If Kitty's alternative proposal is rejected, she 
may well attempt to rescind the contract - an under-
standable strategy, but one which the land trust must 
energetically resist. Under contract principles, agree-
ments may sometimes be voided for a '·'material mis-
take of fact." Here, however, Kiuy's mistake was 
one of law, not fact, and her chances of achieving 
rescission of the deal would appear to be negligible. 
A glimmer of hope. Given the proper factual 
circumstances - a high-priority potential acquisi-
tion, the opportunity for a significant bargain pur-
chase, and the feasibility of maintaining the corporate 
existence of the target corporation - a stock acquisi-
tion may be feasible. It may be possible to avoid 
corporate tax entirely by maintaining the corporate 
identity of the target corporation as a for-profit sub-
sidiary company. It may also be advisable, in some 
circumstances, to consider a conversion of the target 
corporation from for-profit to non-profit status; for 
example, to a §501(c)(2) title-holding company or a 
§509(a)(3) support organization. Although one might 
expect the IRS to take a dim view of such a conver-
sion plan, experience indicates that IRS approval of 
the shift to nonprofit status may indeed be obtainable 
in proper circumstances. 
Acquisitions from Estates and Trusts 
Even the most intrepid land trust negotiator is apt 
to quiver when faced with the difficulty of acquiring 
estate- or trust-owned property. Not only are tax 
benefits likely to be of minimal consequence, but the 
executor's or trustee's fiduciary duties may virtually 
bar any transaction in which the entity does not re-
ceive fair market value. But on rare occasions, where 
all interested parties are able to put conservation ahead 
of financial interests, such transactions do happen. 
Our attempt here is simply to provide a brief intro-
duction to the most frequently encountered acquisi-
tion scenarios and problems. 
The Nature of Estates 
An estate is a taxable legal entity which comes 
into existence upon the death of an individual, and 
lasts for such period as is necessary to satisfy the 
liabilities of the decedent and distribute his or her 
properties according to the dictates of a will (or, in 
the case of a decedent who dies intestate, according to 
the applicable laws of succession). Estate properties 
which are the subject of testamentary charitable dis-
positions will of course be distributed out of the 
estate to the named charitable beneficiaries, produc-
ing a charitable deduction for estate tax purposes. 
We are not here concerned with those properties (it is 
too late to do anything about charitable testamentary 
planning), but rather with such land, or interests in 
land, as to which no specific devise obtains. 
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The problem for the land trust, in such a situa-
tion, is that the executor has a fiduciary duty to real-
Ize maximum value on each asset of the estate for the 
designated beneficiaries. In an exceedingly unusual 
case, the executor may be given some latitude to 
;nake discretionary charitable contributions, although 
lhe inefficiency of such a will provision should be 
i,atcntly obvious (there is no charitable dcdi)i'1;'!1 'f 
t'state tax purposes unless the directive is 
When confronted with the implacable demands 
{ an executor's fiduciary duties, oftcn as not thc best 
qrategy is to plan the conservation acquisition with 
thc beneficiary or beneficiaries who stand to receivc 
1 he target property on distribution out of the estate. If 
the property is the subject of a specific bequcst, the 
ultimate deslination of the property will bc known, 
lfl(1 the land trust may commence to negotiate with 
tile named beneficiary. If the property is part of the 
rcsiduary estate, it may be possible to work with the 
,_'xecutor and beneficiaries to structure an equitable 
distribution that will place the target property in thc 
hands of those most charitably inclined, or those besl 
a/'k to take advantage of charitable contribution tax 
h~ncfits (not necessarily the same folks). 
r rust Properties 
I\.1ereiy knowing the property is held in trust 
provides very little intelligence about the degree of 
difficulty apt to be encountered in pursuit of its acqui-
"lUon. Trust ownership may be no barrier at all, or, at 
other pole, it may effectively preclude any land 
trust attempt to acquire it, even by a full-price pur-
,liase. 
"Living trusts." So-called "living trusts" arc 
\ 1ftcn established as an clement of an estate plan. 
These trusts are revocable; their principal objective is 
ill streamline and simplify the probate process ---
property held in such a trust bypasses the probate 
::st~itc and is applied directly according to the tcm1S of 
ih\:' trust. For income tax purposes, however, such a 
UlJst has no independent tax significance; trust prop-
,'rIICS arc treated as owned directly by the grantor. 
;hus there is no discouragement arising out of the 
:rllst's legal title to a target parcel. The potentia! 
;nor will be treated as owning the property directiy, 
,1!1d the land trust negotiator will be free to represent 
entire galaxy of charitable acquisition possibili-
:!('s applicable to any individually owned property 0 
Family trusts. If the trust is irrevocable, and has 
heen established to provide for the management of 
Jllcome-producing properties lor thl' bl~n('rit of one or 
,iIOft' family members (ofren mcmrK'rs of one or more 
dlccessor generations to the trust' '; settlor), the same 
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fiduciary duty barrier is apt to be confronted as in the 
case of property held by an estate. In some cases, a 
family trust may allow the trustee to make charitable 
distributions out of current income, often in favor of 
specifically named charitable beneficiaries. More 
commonly, income of such a family trust is entirely 
distributable to noncharitablc persons; thus any chari-
tr~hk gIft (of an c.:.ts,ement, for example) or bargain 
,\ uuld :-;erve to derogate the interests of the cur-
rent beneficiaries, the persons entitled to take the 
remainder upon termination of the trust, or both. 
Problem (/3)0 Laidlaw Walkup established by 
will a trust to provide income for life for his three 
children, Curlew, Dufus, and Jane, with a suc-
ceeding 21-year income interest in such grand-
children of Laidlaw as survive the death of the 
last child to die. After the termination of tile 
grandchildren'S 21-year lJlcome interest, the cor-
pus of the trust property is to be distributed to 
Laidlaw's then-surviving grandchildren and/or 
great-grandchildren. Upon Laidlaw's death in 
1967, his children were in their 40s, and he had 
seven grandchildren. Today, Curlew, Dufus, and 
Jane arc all in reasonably good health and their 
seven grandchildren have produced five great-
grandchildren. 
T\1ost of the trust's properties are blue-chip 
stocks and government bonds, but the trustee 
holds as well a 3,200-acre tract of Oregon tim-
berland, which Laidlaw dirccted to be held for 
not less than 25 years, subject to sustained-yield 
timber harvesting. The Sasquatch Land Trust 
would like to acquire that property, which has 
recently been appraised at $2.5 million, and won-
ders about the possibility, and tax efficacy, of a 
bargain purchase from the trust at a price of $1.5 
million. 
On the assumption that the tenns of the trust 
cannot allow the trustee the discretion to make such a 
contrihutlon (generally a reliablc working assump-
tion), in order to do so the trustee would presumably 
have to secure the approval of each trust beneficiary, 
including each contingent remainder beneficiary -----
grandchildren and great-grandchildren, and a guard-
ian representing the interests of unborn contingent 
remainder beneficiaries. Court-appointed guardians 
are usually required to represent the interests of mi-
nors and unborn persons, and the entire acquisition 
plan will be subject to court review and approval. 
The prospect of running that procedural gauntlet is 
daunting indeed. 
In some cases, it may be more promising to at-
tempt to arrange for 3 disposition out of the trust to 
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one or more beneficiaries who both favor the bargain 
conveyance and are personally willing to assume the 
cost of making the gift. In our problem, for example, 
if Dufus' interest in the trust is actuarially worth $2.5 
million or more, he might seek the approval of each 
other beneficiary to permit a distribution of the target 
property to him (such distribution would not cause 
recognition of gain to either Dufus or the trust, and he 
would inherit the trust's basis in the property), so as 
to set the stage for Dufus to make the suggested 
bargain sale. Such a scenario is by no means bereft of 
technical problems, but is apt to have a considerably 
higher probability for success than would a bargain 
sale out of the trust itself. 
Charitable trusts. Acquisitions of properties from 
trusts which have exclusive or substantial charitable 
purposes raise problems not radically different from 
those pertaining to family trusts. The trustee of an 
exclusively charitable trust, which mayor may not be 
a tax-exempt organization, will be bound to apply the 
income of that trust to its stated charitable purposes. 
If, happily, the trustee's charge is broad enough to 
permit distributions of income and/or assets for the 
benefit of a land trust which seeks to acquire one of 
that trust's properties for conservation purposes, the 
acquisition may be as straightforward as seeking a 
major grant from a foundation. But if the trustee is 
bound to apply the resources of the trust to the pro-
motion of animal welfare or research on the decline 
of civility in urban societies, a fair market value deal 
may be all that is available. 
Charitable remainder trusts are apt to pose simi-
lar fiduciary problems. Even if the land trust which 
seeks to acquire a target property from a charitable 
remainder trust is the sole remainder beneficiary, sale 
by the trustee at a bargain price would likely affect 
the interests of the income beneficiaries, probably 
endangering the qualification of the trust as a tax-
exempt entity. A sale at full fair market value would 
not be proscribed, however (note that the self-dealing 
rules would not prevent that transaction, since the 
land trust would not be a "disqualified person"), and 
it ought to be possible to effect such a sale under the 
installment method. Where the income beneficiaries' 
interests are (actuarially) of short duration, the land 
trust might well expect to satisfy a substantial part of 
the installment obligation upon termination of the 
trust. 
Charitable income trusts typically provide an 
income stream to one or more charities for a term of 
years, with the remainder paid over to noncharitable 
persons (generally younger-generation family mem-
bers) at the termination of the trust. Where the land 
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trust is also the income beneficiary, however, it may 
be possible to commute or diminish the land trust's 
income interest in return for a distribution or bargain 
purchase of the target property. Such an approach 
would surely require the concurrence of the remain-
der beneficiaries and, very likely, court approval. 
Tax Benefits for the Estate or Trust 
As we have seen, executors and trustees will very 
rarely have the discretion to make charitable contri-
butions not approved by the governing instrument, 
but, in those rare cases where an acceptable plan to 
have a contribution or bargain sale made by the entity 
is fashioned, tax benefits may be germane. Accord-
ingly, we shall attempt here a very cursory descrip-
tion of the system of taxation applicable to both es-
tates and trusts. 
Estates and trusts are taxable entities subject to 
rates of tax identical to those applicable to individu-
als (although the top marginal bracket is reached very 
quickly). They are, however, permitted deductions 
for distributions of income properly made to their 
income beneficiaries. Thus, to take a simple case, an 
estate which received $5,000 in interest and divi-
dends during one of its taxable years during the pe-
riod of estate administration, could completely elimi-
nate its tax liability by distributing at least $5,000 to 
its beneficiaries during that year (or within the first 
65 days of the following year). The distribution 
deduction in effect makes the estate or trust a quasi-
taxable entity; i.e., taxable only to the extent that it 
does not, or cannot, limit its liability through distribu-
tions. 
As to charitable contributions, the operative re-
quirements for estates and trusts differ. An estate 
may achieve a charitable contribution deduction with 
respect to such amount of its gross income, for a 
particular year, as is irrevocably set aside for chari-
table purposes, as well as for such amounts as are 
actually paid to accomplish charitable purposes (in-
cluding, of course, distributions of cash or property to 
properly qualified charitable organizations.) The 
nonexempt trust, however, enjoys no "set-aside" de-
duction; only amounts actually paid to charity out of 
gross income will qualify. 
Neither an estate nor a trust is subject to any 
percentage limitation. If the governing instrument 
and/or the affected noncharitable beneficiaries so per-
mit, an estate or trust may eliminate its entire taxable 
income through charitable contributions (a frequent 
state of affairs with respect to distributions made by 
charitable income trusts). 
-
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